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COMMENT
Where's Einstein When You Need Him?
Assessing the Role of Relative Qualifications
in a Plaintiff's Case of Failure-to-Promote
Under Title VII
Perhaps nothing in the large, judicially created body of law that
fleshed out Title VII's antidiscriminationmandates has been more of
a double-edged sword to victims of discrimination than the Supreme
Court's loose adaptation of the "primafacie case" concept as the
framework for organizing proof in Title VII cases.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The reference to Einstein in the title of this comment appropriately
acknowledges the great mind who first articulated the concept of relativity-the notion of measuring one thing in light of another. Einstein eloquently explained, "When you sit with a nice girl for two hours, you
think it's only a minute. But when you sit on a hot stove for a minute,
you think it's two hours. That's relativity." 2 The concept of relativity
plays an important role in cases of promotion discrimination in the
workplace, as the plaintiff denied promotion and the defendantemployer both may wish to point to the relative qualifications of the
person(s) actually promoted in order to carry the day. As a thorough
reading of this comment will make clear, assessing the proper role of
relative qualifications in the failure-to-promote context is not necessarily
a routine task susceptible to a ready-made solution. Needless to say, in
undertaking this task, having Einstein on hand might prove extremely
helpful. Fortunately, however, based upon Supreme Court precedent,
the question at the center of this comment-whether a failure-to-promote plaintiff should be required to establish that she is relatively more
qualified than the promoted employee-is quite answerable, even absent
Einstein's assistance. As I shall argue, simply put, the answer to that
1. Jeffery A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 74 (2003).
2. THE HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 443 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed., 3rd ed. 1993).
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question is "no," although relative qualifications can and should be utilized by plaintiffs and defendants alike in the proper case.
In this comment, my argument is cast through an intra-circuit split
in the case law of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the context
of failure-to-promote cases, the Eleventh Circuit has revealed a certain
bipolar tendency by only sometimes requiring a plaintiff to prove herself
relatively more qualified than the employee actually promoted. Such a
split in the case law presents a unique opportunity to determine what the
prevailing rule ought to be in the Eleventh Circuit, and, more importantly, in failure-to-promote cases generally.

II.

TITLE

VII

AND THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, in the context of
employment, an employer from discriminating against an individual on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In some cases
of intentional disparate treatment, the plaintiff will be able to present
direct evidence of discrimination. (For example, where an employer
says to the plaintiff, "I'm firing you because you are x and I hate all
people of the x race," direct evidence of discrimination exists.) In the
vast majority of cases, however, the plaintiff will have to present circumstantial evidence to create an inference (or presumption) 4 of intentional discrimination that the fact-finder is then free to believe or
disbelieve. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,5 the Supreme Court
laid out the now familiar burden-shifting framework for a circumstantial
evidence case. First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of
discrimination. This may be done by demonstrating (1) that she is a
member of a protected class, (2) that she applied and was qualified for a
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provides that:
(a) Employer practices-It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (emphasis added).
4. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1183-84 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1998), for an interesting
discussion of whether the plaintiffs prima facie case establishes an inference or a presumption of
discrimination. The Walker majority concluded that the prima facie case establishes a
presumption. Id. The Walker concurrence, however, wrote separately to express the view that the
prima facie case does, in fact, establish an inference of discrimination. Id. at 1197-99.
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) that despite her
qualifications, she was rejected, and (4) that after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications
from persons of the plaintiff's qualifications.6 If the plaintiff succeeds
in establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, the burden
of production (but not persuasion) shifts to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs rejection.7
If the employer remains silent in the face of the plaintiffs prima facie
case and the fact-finder believes the plaintiff's evidence, the court must
enter judgment for the plaintiff because there is no issue of fact remaining in the case.8 On the other hand, assuming the employer does articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the onus returns to the
plaintiff, who is given an opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's
proffered reason is not worthy of credence and that the employment
action is best explained by unlawful discrimination. At this stage, the
burden to show pretext merges with the plaintiffs ultimate burden of
persuasion to demonstrate that the employer possessed an unlawful
intent to discriminate.9
III.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SPLIT

A.

Problem: Dueling Standards

Title VII applies to all facets of the employment relationship,
including the realm of employee promotion.' The Supreme Court has
noted that the elements of the prima facie case described in McDonnell
Douglas are "not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."'" Thus, courts have attempted to tailor the framework
to various types of cases, such as, for example, cases alleging promotion
discrimination. In failure-to-promote cases, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals has inconsistently defined what a plaintiff must show in
order to establish a prima facie case. In one line of cases, the court has
required the plaintiff to demonstrate (1) that she belonged to a protected
group, (2) that she applied and was qualified for a job for which her
6. Id. at 802.
7. Id.; Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981) (stating that the
ultimate burden of persuading the fact-finder that the defendant intentionally discriminated
remains at all times with the plaintiff, and that the defendant's burden to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason is merely one of production).
8. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.

9. Id. at 256 ("[Plaintiff's] burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer
or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.").
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
11. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
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employer was seeking applications, (3) that despite her qualifications,
she was rejected for the position, and (4) that after the rejection, her
employer kept the position open or filled it with a person not belonging
to the plaintiffs protected group.' 2 In another line of cases, the court
has required the plaintiff to prove an additional fifth element-that other
equally or less qualified employees not belonging to the protected group
were promoted instead.' 3 In other words, in the second line of cases, in
order for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the Eleventh Circuit has required her to demonstrate that she was, relative to the
employee actually promoted, equally or more qualified.
The first line of cases dates back to Crawford v. Western Electric
Co., 4 a case decided in 1980 when the Eleventh Circuit was part of the
Fifth Circuit. 5 Crawford was a complicated case in which several African-American employees alleged, inter alia, that the promotion procedures of the defendant-employer, Western Electric, were being applied
in a racially discriminatory manner.' 6 Western Electric's Jacksonville
Installation Division was responsible for installing, modifying, and
removing telephone company central office equipment.' 7 Under a collective bargaining agreement with the Communication Workers of
America, Western Electric paid its installers an hourly wage that corresponded with an assigned skill category called an index.' 8 Installers
were hired at the lowest skill level, Index 1.'9 In order to obtain promotion to higher index levels, installers were required to perform a certain
amount of work associated with a higher index and receive a rating from
a supervisor indicating qualification for the higher index level.2 0
The plaintiffs filed suit under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981,21 but the Title VII claims were disposed of on partial summary
12. See, e.g., Crawford v. W. Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980).
13. See, e.g., Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983).
14. 614 F.2d 1300.
15. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted all opinions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981 as
binding precedent. Therefore, the Crawford decision is part of the Eleventh Circuit's controlling
case law.
16. Crawford, 614 F.2d at 1311.
17. Id. at 1309.
18. Id. at 1310.
19. Id. at 1311.
20. Id.
21. § 1981 provides:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
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judgment due to failure to comply with administrative pre-requisites. 22
The § 1981 claims proceeded to trial where the plaintiffs testified that
certain white installers who had been simultaneously or subsequently
hired were more successful in achieving promotions to higher index
levels.23 In addition, the plaintiffs proffered evidence that they had not
been assigned work corresponding with the higher index levels, despite
having requested such work from their supervisors. 24 The plaintiffs further testified that, during the 1960s, some of their supervisors used
racially-motivated language and addressed them as "boys. ' 25 Finally,
the plaintiffs also attacked statistical evidence put forth by Western
Electric.2 6 As the court summarized:
Basically, then, plaintiffs sought to prove discrimination both in work
assignments and in the index review process. They alleged that they
were not given work assignments that would allow them to advance
as rapidly as whites to higher indexes and that the subjective nature
of both the process by which work assignments are made and the
process by which installers are rated "qualified" operated to impede
black installers' advancement within the index system.27
The district court found in favor of Western Electric, concluding that
each plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under § 198 128 because they had not produced evidence "to show
that they were qualified to do the work that they claim was discriminatorily denied them. 2 9
In reviewing the district court's determination as to the § 1981
claims, the Crawford court proceeded with the assumption that a prima
facie case of race discrimination would be made out only if the plaintiffs
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
22. With respect to the Title VII claims, the Crawford court remanded for adjudication,
finding that the plaintiffs had not properly received "unequivocal notice" that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission would not sue Western Electric, and consequently, the
plaintiffs Title VII claims were not time barred. Crawford, 614 F.2d at 1307. The Crawford
court's handling of the § 1981 claims is more relevant to this comment, for it is through those
claims that the court addresses the requirements of a plaintiffs prima facie case in the failure-topromote context.
23. Id. at 1314.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1312.
27. Id. at 1314-15.
28. Like Title VII claims, allegations of discrimination under § 1981 are analyzed using the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186
(1989) (holding that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme of proof should apply in § 1981
cases); see also Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998).
29. Crawford, 614 F.2d at 1315.
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could establish each element of the McDonnell Douglas test.3" As
noted above, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated that they were "qualified" for promotion, presumably
meaning that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the second element of the
prima facie case. The Crawfordcourt disagreed with that determination:
"Establishing qualifications is an employer's prerogative, but an
employer may not utilize wholly subjective standards by which to judge
its employees' qualifications and then plead lack of qualification when
its promotion process, for example, is challenged as discriminatory."'"
The plaintiffs had demonstrated during trial that Western Electric's
index review system was highly dependent on subjective elements.3 2
Thus, the court concluded, all plaintiffs who sought promotion to a
higher index level proved themselves qualified with respect to the second element of the prima facie case.33 Additionally, the court found that
all but two of the plaintiffs had satisfied the remainder of the McDonnell
Douglas elements by proffering credible evidence of racial conduct by
Western Electric, as well as statistically demonstrating a significant disparity in the rate of advancement of African American installers as compared to whites. 34 Therefore, according to the court, all but two of the
plaintiffs succeeded in raising an inference that work in higher index
levels was discriminatorily given to white employees. 35
The court then turned to the question of whether Western Electric
had successfully rebutted each plaintiffs prima facie case. While concluding that the district court had given improper weight to some of the
evidence proffered in the rebuttal stage, the Crawford court found that
Western Electric's evidence proving that economic factors played a significant role in reducing available work, coupled with the fact that supervisors had been instructed to assign work in a race-neutral manner,
would suffice to rebut a prima facie case. 36 The case was remanded,
however, for the district court, sitting in its fact-finding capacity, to
determine whether Western Electric's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were sufficient to rebut each prima facie case by the
30. Id. In order to satisfy the test, the plaintiffs were required to show (1) that they belonged
to a protected group, (2) that they sought and were qualified for positions that Western Electric
was attempting to fill, (3) that despite their qualifications they were rejected, and (4) that after
their rejection Western Electric either continued to attempt to fill the positions or in fact filled the
positions with whites. Id.
31. Id. (citation omitted).
32. Id. at 1316.
33. Id. at 1317.
34. Id. at 1318.
35. Id. at 1320.
36. Id. at 1319.
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applicable standard-i.e., a preponderance of the evidence. 7
While the outcome of the Crawford case is not particularly significant for purposes of this comment, the court's articulation of the elements that a plaintiff must satisfy in order to establish a prima facie case
of promotion discrimination is centrally important. The Crawford court
implicitly found that the elements as articulated in McDonnell Douglas
were applicable in the failure-to-promote context.
The requirement of relative qualifications was not imposed in the
38
Eleventh Circuit until 1983, when Perryman v. Johnson Products Co.
became the first case of the second, divergent line. In that case, the
plaintiffs filed a class action under Title VII against Johnson Products, a
cosmetics manufacturer and distributor, alleging both individual acts of
sex discrimination in hiring, promotion, and termination, as well as a
pattern or practice of discrimination affecting the plaintiff class. 39 The
district court found, inter alia, that the plaintiffs had successfully shown
n°
a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination on account of sex.
The district court also found that Johnson Products had not proffered
any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and, therefore,
judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.4"
In reviewing the district court's findings, the Perryman court was
not asked to address whether the plaintiffs had successfully established a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. Rather, the primary issue
on appeal was whether the defendant, Johnson Products, had satisfied its
burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
employment decisions. In this regard, the court concluded that Johnson
Products had presented a "vigorous defense" that was sufficient to rebut
the plaintiffs' prima facie showing and, as a result, the district court's
conclusion to the contrary was clearly erroneous."2 Therefore, the Perryman court remanded the case for consideration of the evidence proffered by Johnson Products and also to provide the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to demonstrate pretext.4 3
In reaching its conclusion, the Perryman court identified the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case of promotion discrimination.'
Peculiarly, the last of the identified elements required the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
that he

Id. at 1320.
698 F.2d 1138 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1141, 1144.
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1142 n.7. To establish a prima facie case under Perryman, a plaintiff must prove
or she (1) is a member of a protected minority, (2) was qualified for and applied for the
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plaintiff to show "that other employees with equal or lesser qualifications who were not members of the protected minority were pro-

moted.

'45

With that articulation, the Perryman court forced the plaintiff

to present proof of relative qualifications. In support of that requirement, the court-surprisingly-cited to Crawford, as well as a case

from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, Bundy v. Jackson.46 However
strange the citation to Bundy may seem,4 7 the Perryman court's citation
to Crawford is even more baffling because, as explained above, Crawford did not require the plaintiff to demonstrate relative qualifications at
the prima facie case stage. Regardless of the degree of accuracy in its
citations, however, the Perryman court became the first panel of the
Eleventh Circuit to impose such a requirement, and consequently, the
decision marked the "birth" of an intra-circuit split.
B.

Resolution: And the Winner Is...

Having identified the intra-circuit split, the next task is to determine
which of the two rules is, in fact, the prevailing standard. This assessment is made by asking and answering two questions. First, which standard is prevailing from a legal standpoint? Second, which standard is
prevailing in practice? If both questions could be answered with an
identical response, the Eleventh Circuit split would be less consequential. Since the prevailing legal standard has not prevailed in practice,
however, an interesting tension has emerged in the Circuit's case law.
promotion, (3) was rejected despite these qualifications, and (4) that other employees with equal
or lesser qualifications who were not members of the protected minority were promoted. See id.
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Bundy, the plaintiff alleged that her rejection of
unsolicited sexual advances from several supervisors led those supervisors to delay and block
promotions to which she was entitled. Id. at 938. The court first identified the general
requirements of a prima facie case of promotion discrimination:
[T]o make out a prima facie case the plaintiff must show that she belongs to a
protected group, that she was qualified for and applied for a promotion, that she was
considered for and denied the promotion, and that other employees of similar
qualifications who were not members of the protected group were indeed promoted
at the time the plaintiff's request for promotion was denied.
Id. at 951. Then, interestingly, the court opted to "relax" the requirements for the plaintiff at hand,
stating:
[W]e are not requiring the plaintiff to show as part of her prima facie case that other
employees who were no better qualified, but who were not similarly disadvantaged,
were promoted at the time she was denied a promotion. We relieve the plaintiff of
the need to prove such facts because ... we think her burden should be eased where
she can prove not only that she is a member of a disadvantaged group, but also that
she has personally suffered illegal discrimination through the harassment itself.
Id. at 953.
47. Given the controlling nature of Crawford, a case from within the court's jurisdiction, the
citation to Bundy is nothing short of odd.

2006]

FAILURE-TO-PROMOTE UNDER TITLE VII

The Crawford rule, which does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate relative qualifications, is the legally prevailing standard. In
Walker v. Mortham,"8 the Eleventh Circuit had occasion to confront the
intra-circuit split head-on. In that case, African-American applicants
and employees of the state of Florida filed suit under Title VII, alleging
that the state had engaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of race
discrimination in its employment decisions.4 9 Following a non-jury trial
on the merits, the district court assumed that each individual plaintiff
had established a prima facie case, but nonetheless entered judgment for
the state; the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination in light of the state's
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.5 ° On appeal, the case
was reversed and remanded because the appellate court found that the
state had not articulated any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
employment decisions. 5 ' In sum, the appellate court stated that "a court
may not assume, based on its own perusal of the record, that the decision-maker in a particular case was motivated by a legitimate reason
when the defendant has offered none."52 Therefore, the appellate court
found remand necessary to determine which plaintiffs had actually
established prima facie cases so that judgment could be entered in their
favor. 53 On remand, the district court concluded that none of the plaintiffs had satisfied the burden of establishing a prima facie case, and
again entered judgment for the state.5" Once again, the plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that the district court had applied incorrect legal standards in assessing whether each individual had established a prima facie
case. 55 At that point in the litigation, the Walker court addressed the
requirements necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in both hiring and promotion.
First, the Walker court noted the approach used by the district court
below. On remand, in order to establish a prima facie case, each plaintiff had been asked to prove (1) that he was a member of a protected
class, (2) that he applied for and was qualified for the position in question, (3) that a person not a member of the protected class with equal or
lesser qualifications received the position, and (4) that the adverse
employment action complained of was actually taken against him.56 The
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

158 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1181-82.
Id. at 1181 n.8.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
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plaintiffs argued that the district court had erred by including the third
element, which required proof of relative qualifications.5 7 As the
Walker court observed, the district court did not distinguish between hiring and promotion discrimination; the district court had demanded that
all plaintiffs prove identical elements in order to make out a prima facie
case. Finding that approach erroneous, the Walker court responded:
"[W]e appear to have articulated different standards for a prima facie
case depending on whether the relevant Title VII claim is classified as a
'failure to hire' or a 'failure to promote' claim. 5 8 The court then proceeded to address the appropriate elements in the failure-to-promote
context, noting the formula articulated in Crawford, which does not
require proof of relative qualifications. 59 But, the Walker court also
noted the Perryman formula, which, as already stated, does require the
plaintiff to demonstrate that "'other employees with equal or lesser
qualifications who were not members of the protected minority were
promoted."' 6 0
Confronted with two conflicting rules, the Walker court observed:
"In deciding which line of precedent to follow, we are, ironically, faced
with two conflicting lines of precedent." 6 The first line of precedent
holds that when there is intra-circuit conflict, a panel is to determine
which line is most consistent with Supreme Court authority or the
majority of case law within the circuit.6 2 If there are no analogous
Supreme Court cases, and the cases within the circuit are somewhat
evenly divided, then the panel should use common sense and reason to
determine which line of precedent to follow.6 3 By contrast, the second
line of precedent holds that intra-circuit conflict should be resolved by
giving credence to the rule that stems from the earliest case. 6' This second approach acknowledges that a decision of one panel cannot be overturned by a later panel.6 5 To overturn a prior panel decision, the circuit
is required to conduct a hearing en banc, which allows the entire court to
consider whether to depart from prior circuit precedent.
Faced with this "fork in the road," the Walker court, "in a very
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1186.
60. Id. at 1186-87 (quoting Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 n.7 (llth
Cir. 1983)).
61. Id. at 1188.
62. Id.
63. ld.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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careful and searching opinion, 66 opted for the earliest-case rule.6 7 As
the court reasoned, adherence to prior precedent is necessary in order to
maintain stability in the law.68 Moreover, the court stated, adherence to
the earliest precedent rule serves to bring intra-circuit splits to "a
screeching halt," whereas the common sense and reason rule can result
in perpetual splits, as different panels reach varying conclusions as to
what is commonsensical and reasonable.6 9 Because Crawford had been
decided prior to Perryman, the Walker panel held that the prima facie
case requirements from Crawford should govern within the Eleventh
Circuit.7" Therefore, the Walker court held that the district court had
erred in requiring each plaintiff to demonstrate equal or superior qualifications relative to the person(s) actually promoted. 7 ' The court proceeded to examine the record to determine whether each individual
plaintiff had produced evidence at trial that, if believed by the district
court, would be otherwise sufficient to establish a prima facie case.72
After identifying several plaintiffs that had produced such evidence, the
Walker court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for a
credibility assessment.7 3 As the court stated, "If the [district] court credits the plaintiffs' evidence establishing the McDonnell-Douglas elements
of a prima facie case, we direct it to adjudge the defendants liable on
74
that claim, and thereafter to fashion an appropriate remedy.
While the Crawford standard may technically be the prevailing precedent, in practice many more courts have adhered to the Perryman
rule.75 Since 1998, despite the efforts of the Walker court to bring the
intra-circuit split to "a screeching halt," the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly followed the Perryman rule requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate relative qualifications in order to establish a prima facie case of promotion
discrimination.7 6
66. Bernstein v. Sephora, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
67. Walker, 158 F.3d at 1188.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1189 n.25.
70. Id. at 1189.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Id. at 1194-96.
73. Id. at 1195.
74. Id. at 1197.
75. As one district court stated, "[c]uriously, Walker did not settle the issue within the
Eleventh Circuit, which has continued to require plaintiffs to show that other candidates for a
denied promotion were less or equally qualified, in order to make out a prima facie case under
Title VII." Bernstein v. Sephora, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (stating further that

"the Court is at a loss to explain the reason for this dissonance").
76. See, e.g., Stuart v. Jefferson County Dep't of Human Res., 152 F. App'x 798, 801 (11th
Cir. 2005); Hithon v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 144 F. App'x 795, 799 (1lth Cir. 2005); Collado v.
United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting in dicta that, in a Title VII
failure to promote case, a plaintiff must demonstrate "that other equally or less qualified
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A recent case is illustrative: In Wilson v. BIE Aerospace, Inc.," the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
to the employer.78 The primary issue of contention was whether the
plaintiff had established a prima facie case of promotion discrimination.
The district court, applying the Perryman standard, concluded that the
plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case because she had failed to
demonstrate qualifications equal or superior to the person actually promoted.79 The Eleventh Circuit panel, while agreeing that the plaintiff
must demonstrate relative qualifications, reversed because the plaintiff
had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether she was equally or more qualified than the promoted
employee.8" Thus, in Wilson, the issue before the court was directly a
result of the application of the Perryman relative qualifications
requirement.
While Wilson appears to represent the trend in the Eleventh Circuit,
a few recent panels have followed Walker.8 In "monkey see, monkey
do" fashion, the district courts within the Eleventh Circuit have similarly
split as to whether a plaintiff must demonstrate relative qualifications in
order to establish a prima facie case of promotion discrimination.82
employees who were not members of the protected class were promoted"); Barron v. Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, 129 F. App'x 512, 516-17 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that "[plaintiff] has not
offered any evidence to show that, compared to him, [the promoted employee] was equally or less
qualified" in holding that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
129 F. App'x 529, 532 (11 th Cir. 2005); Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1183 (11 th
Cir. 2001); Durley v. APAC, Inc., 236 F.3d 651, 655-56 (11 th Cir. 2000); Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc.,
226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1339
(11 th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861, 866 (11th Cir. 1999).
77. 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 2004).
78. Id. at 1092.
79. Id. at 1089.
80. Id.
81. See Crawford v. Johnson, 133 F. App'x 674, 675 (lth Cir. 2005) (concluding
nonetheless that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case); Gamble v. Aramark Unif. Servs.,
132 F. App'x 263, 265 (11 th Cir. 2005) (citing directly to the Walker formulation of a prima facie
case); Wallace v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors, 138 F. App'x 139, 143 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (citing directly
to the Walker formulation); Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11 th Cir.
2005).
82. Compare Wohlhueter v. Cambria Fabshop-Atlanta, Inc., No. Civ.A. 104CV2922JFK,
2005 WL 3359705, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2005) (citing the Walker formulation of a prima facie
case), Walthour v. Rayonier, Inc., No. CV204-133, 2005 WL 3272459, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 30,
2005) (citing the Walker formulation), Milledge v. Rayonier, Inc., No. Civ.A. CV204-133, 2005
WL 2838139, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 27, 2005) (citing the Walker formulation), Johnson v. Ala.
Dep't of Transp., No. 2:04-CV-933-F, 2005 WL 2456009, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 5, 2005) (citing
the McDonnell Douglas formulation), Dalmau v. Vicao Aerea Rio-Grandense, S.A., 337 F. Supp.
2d 1299, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing the Walker formulation), Phillips v. Hibbett Sporting
Goods, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (citing to Walker), Gaddis v. Russell
Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1135 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (citing the Walker formulation); Bernstein v.
Sephora, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that "the Eleventh Circuit precedent
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Thus, notwithstanding the Walker holding declaring Crawford the prevailing rule, the Perryman requirement has not been altogether abandoned at either the court of appeals or district court level.
IV.

RELATIVE QUALIFICATIONS: WHERE

Do

THEY BELONG?

Having identified and discussed the intra-circuit split, the time is
ripe to address what role relative qualifications ought to play in a case
alleging discriminatory failure-to-promote. Should the plaintiff be
required to prove relative qualifications in order to make out a prima
facie case, as the Eleventh Circuit often requires? Or, is it better to
allow the defendant-employer the opportunity to present proof of relative qualifications as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the promotion decision? Or, is it better yet to allow the plaintiff the option of
presenting such evidence in attempting to prove pretext after the defendant articulates its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason? Before
addressing these questions and ultimately reaching a conclusion as to the

proper role of relative qualifications in promotion discrimination cases,
it is worthwhile to survey the various approaches of the other circuits.
Although it is evident that many of the other circuits have also failed to
consistently adhere to a single rule, the variety of approaches nonetheless serves to illustrate the spectrum of possibilities.8 3
on point is not a model of consistency" and agreeing with plaintiff that the Walker formulation
controls), and Miller v. Bed, Bath, & Beyond, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 n.14 (N.D. Ala.
2002) (citing to Walker and noting that "an Eleventh Circuit panel has squarely held, after an
exhaustive review of circuit precedent, that a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory failure-to-promote is not required to show, as part of her prima facie case, that her
qualifications are equal or superior to those of the successful applicant" and "[1]anguage to the
contrary in subsequent panel decisions appears to be dicta, but even if it is not, such decisions
cannot overturn Walker's express holding on point, pursuant to the 'prior panel' precedent rule
governing in this circuit"), with Tillman v. City of Ocala, No. 504CV219OC1OGRJ, 2005 WL
2346951, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2005) (requiring plaintiff to show that other equally or less
qualified employees not belonging to his race were hired), James v. Montgomery Reg'l Airport
Auth., No. Civ.A. 204CVI 122TWO, 2005 WL 2250844, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 15, 2005)
(evidencing a cursory reading of Walker by quoting, out of context, the portion of the opinion
stating that a plaintiff must show that "other equally or less qualified employees who were not
members of the protected class were promoted"-a requirement that, upon a careful reading of
Walker, is clearly repudiated), Caputo-Conyers v. Berkshire Realty Holdings, LP, No.
6:05CV341ORL31KRS, 2005 WL 1862697, at *3 n.6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2005) (requiring
plaintiff to show that other equally or less qualified employees not belonging to the protected
minority were promoted), Ren v. Univ. of Cent. Fla. Bd. of Trs., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1229
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to show that other equally or less qualified employees not
belonging to the protected minority were promoted), Labady v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 350 F.
Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (requiring plaintiff to show that other equally or less
qualified employees not belonging to the protected class were promoted), and Caruso v. City of
Cocoa, 260 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (requiring plaintiff to show that other
equally or less qualified employees not belonging to the protected class were promoted).
83. This survey of the circuits is not intended to be exhaustive of all available approaches.
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The Other Circuits: Various Approaches to the Issue

While some courts have required the plaintiff to demonstrate equal
or superior relative qualifications in a manner essentially analogous to
the Perryman rule,84 several other courts have utilized different
approaches. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have
required proof of relative qualifications in the failure-to-promote con-

text, but not necessarily as an element of the plaintiffs prima facie
case.85 For example, in Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service
Co.,86 the Fourth Circuit only required the plaintiff to show (in order to

establish a prima facie case) that she was rejected under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.8 7 But, in the pretext stage, the court required the plaintiff to present evidence of relative
qualifications in order to counter the defendant's proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.88 In Lyoch v. Anheuser-Busch Cos.,89 the

Eighth Circuit, while asking for proof of relative qualifications at stage
one, 90 only required the plaintiff to show that other similarly qualified
employees outside the protected group were promoted at the time the
plaintiffs request for promotion was denied. 9 1 Similarly, in Brill v.
Lante Corp.,92 the Seventh Circuit required the plaintiff to demonstrate
at stage one that the promoted employee had similaror lesser qualifications for the job. 93 Clearly, as these cases illustrate, proof of relative
qualifications can be required in a variety of ways and at various times

in the burden-shifting framework.
Rather, the approaches noted in the text are merely meant to illustrate the variety of possibilities,
and to give the reader a taste of alternatives.
84. See, e.g., Robbins v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 2000 WL 1703501, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 14,
2000) (holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case because they had not
demonstrated that the promoted employees were equally or less qualified); Payne v. Milwaukee
County, 146 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1998) (requiring proof that "the employee promoted was not
more qualified than [the plaintiff]").
85. See, e.g., Haynes v. Penzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000); Pafford v. Herman,
148 F.3d 658, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1998); Lyoch v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 139 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir.
1998); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir. 1996).
86. 80 F.3d 954.
87. Id. at 959-60.
88. Id. at 960.
89. 139 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1998).
90. The reference to "stage one" simply reflects the fact that a plaintiff, under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, initially has the burden of establishing a prima facie case. Then, in stage
two, the defendant-employer has the burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the employment decision. Finally, in stage three, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating pretext and, ultimately, proving intentional illegal discrimination. Thus, in the
remainder of this comment, references to stages one, two, or three are meant to correspond
accordingly with the stages of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
91. Lyoch, 139 F.3d at 614.
92. 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 1270.
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On the other hand, some courts have not required any showing of
relative qualifications. For example, in Howley v. Town of Stratford,9 4
the Second Circuit insisted only that the plaintiff demonstrate that "the
denial occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on a basis forbidden by Title VII." 95 And, in Cruz v. Coach
Stores, Inc.,96 the Second Circuit required the plaintiff to show that her
job performance was satisfactory, but did not require any evidence of
relative qualifications.9 7
B.

Resolution: The Proper Role of Relative Qualifications

While the examples above illustrate that the issue of relative qualifications can be handled in a variety of ways in the failure-to-promote
context, they fail to directly answer the ultimate question-i.e., whether
a plaintiff should be required to present evidence of relative qualifications, particularly as an element of the prima facie case. To answer this
question, one must carefully examine Supreme Court precedent to
uncover the subtle guidance contained therein.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court first had occasion to lay out
the elements of the prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.9 8 Therein, the Court stated that a plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of race discrimination by showing (1) that he belongs to
a racial minority, (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4) that after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from
persons of plaintiffs qualifications. 99 In a footnote, the Court stated
that circumstances will necessarily vary from case-to-case, and that the
elements of the prima facie case from McDonnell Douglas are "not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."'" It
appears from the footnote that the Court intended to give the lower
courts a degree of leeway to formulate the elements of the prima facie
case, depending upon the type of discrimination involved. For example,
in articulating that the plaintiff must show that he belongs to a racial
minority, the Court did not intend to prevent a victim of sex discrimination from establishing a prima facie case, merely because she is unable
to demonstrate that she belongs to a racial minority. The term "racial
94. 217 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000).

95. Id. at 150.
96. 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 565.
98. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

99. Id. at 802.
100. Id. at 802 n.13.
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minority" is itself somewhat misleading because Title VII bars discrimination in employment because of an individual's race, color, sex, or
national origin.'01 While the statute does indeed cover racial discrimination against individuals belonging to a racial minority, it just as equally
applies to discrimination because of race against individuals of racial
majorities. In light of the Court's footnote, lower courts have interpreted McDonnell Douglas as merely requiring a plaintiff to show that
he or she belongs to a protected group. While it is clear that the requirements of the prima facie case were not intended to be "inflexible," ' 2 the
courts that have demanded proof of relative qualifications at stage one
have gone too far.
Since McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court has, on a number of
occasions, attempted to clarify the burden-shifting framework, most
notably in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.10 3 In
Burdine, the plaintiff had applied for a promotion to a supervisory position with the defendant's Public Service Careers Division (PSC).""° Due
to internal inefficiencies at PSC (including overstaffing and lack of communication among staff), the post remained unfilled for six months,
despite the plaintiff's application.'0 5 Then, the defendant's executive
director filled the supervisory position with a male from another division
of the agency. 106 The plaintiff was fired along with two other employees, while another male, Walz, was retained as the only professional
employee at PSC.'0 7 Although the defendant ultimately rehired the
plaintiff and assigned her to a different division, the plaintiff filed suit
based on the prior promotion and termination decisions, alleging gender
V 0 8 After a bench trial, the
discrimination in violation of Title VII.
district court found for the defendant on both claims, concluding that the
burden of articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment decisions had been satisfied.0 9 While affirming the district
court with respect to the failure-to-promote claim, the Fifth Circuit
reversed on the termination claim, finding that the defendant had not
proved its nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderance of the
evidence. 1 0
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the question presented was
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978).
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 251-52.
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whether the defendant had to prove its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderance of the evidence in order to succeed in rebutting
the plaintiff's prima facie case."' The Court answered this question in
the negative, stating that the defendant's burden was one of production,

not persuasion."

2

According to the Court, in order to rebut the plain-

tiff's prima facie case, the defendant need only introduce admissible evi3
dence outlining the legitimate reasons for the plaintiff's rejection."
The various stages of the Burdine case suggest that the plaintiff
should not be forced to present proof of relative qualifications. Notably,
the district court did not require the plaintiff to prove relative qualifica-

tions in order to establish a prima facie case of promotion discrimination
in the first instance. 14 Nor did the Fifth Circuit's specification of a
prima facie case of promotion discrimination include proof of relative
Instead, Fifth Circuit precedent placed this burden
qualifications.'
squarely on the defendant in the rebuttal stage." 6 When the case
111. Id. at 250.
112. Id. at 259-60.
113. Id. at 254.

114. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, No A-74-CA-238, 1976 WL 13364 (W.D. Tex.
1976). The district court's opinion does not mention the McDonnell Douglas framework, nor does
it articulate the specific elements of the prima facie case. But, one can deduce that the plaintiff
was not required to demonstrate relative qualifications at stage one. The court, in concluding that
the plaintiff had not proved her promotion discrimination claim, stated that the defendant had
raised the issue of relative qualifications as its justification for not promoting the plaintiff. See id.
("Mr. Fuller testified that the employment decision with regard to the reorganization and its
related promotion, transfer and terminations were made on the basis of his evaluations and the
recommendations of others concerning the relative qualifications of the individuals involved and
what would be best for the PSC program."). The issue, then, was whether the defendant's
proffered reason was pretextual, and the court concluded that it was not. See id. ("This Court can
find no evidence that indicates that the decision not to give the Plaintiff a position in the
reorganized PSC division was based on any sexual discrimination. The Court finds that these
decisions were based on a good faith, rational evaluation of the relative qualifications of the
parties in question and what would be in the best interest of the PSC program."). This reading of
the district court's opinion is borne out by the subsequent opinion of the Supreme Court, wherein
the Court was concerned with the nature of the defendant's burden in stage two, not with the
burden on the plaintiff in stage one. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257 ("We have stated consistently
that the employee's prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates
lawful reasons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only
produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the
employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals
would require the defendant to introduce evidence which, in the absence of any evidence of
pretext, would persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This exceeds
what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden of production.").
115. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 608 F.2d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In order to
establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a group protected by Title
VII, (2) she applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants,
(3) despite her qualifications she was rejected, and (4) after her rejection the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants among person's having plaintiff's
qualifications.").
116. Id. at 567 (stating that the defendant must prove that the persons hired or promoted were
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reached the high court, the Supreme Court did not require the plaintiff to
prove relative qualifications in order to make out a prima facie case.
While the Court did not have occasion to consider the failure-to-promote
claim affirmed below, it appears to have lumped the promotion and termination claims together in determining whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination:
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent
has proved a prima facie case. She showed that she was a qualified
woman who sought an available position, but the position was left
open for several months before she finally was rejected
in favor of a
17
male, Walz, who had been under her supervision.'
Regardless, nowhere in the Court's articulation of the plaintiff's prima
facie case does one find proof of relative qualifications. The Court, noting that the burden of establishing a prima facie case is "not onerous,"
merely required that the plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an
' 18
inference of unlawful discrimination."'
Eight years after deciding Burdine, the Court again found itself
refining and explaining the McDonnell Douglas framework in the case
of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 19 In Patterson, the plaintiff, an
somehow better qualified than was the plaintiff). On appeal, the Supreme Court found this
requirement to be erroneous because it would require employers to choose the minority or female
candidate whenever such a candidate's objective qualifications were not exceeded by those of the
non-minority or male applicant. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259 (stating that Title VII does not
demand that employers give preferential treatment to minorities or women). Interestingly, the
Supreme Court concludes that "it is the plaintiffs task to demonstrate that similarly situated
employees were not treated equally." Id. at 249. In support of this assertion the Court cites to the
portion of McDonnell Douglas dealing with the plaintiff's burden in the pretext stage (NOT the
primafacie case stage). Id. at 258 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). The Court was
later required to revisit the nature of the plaintiffs burden at the pretext stage in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), discussed infra.
117. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6. The Court's mention of Walz, the male employee who was
retained at PSC after the plaintiff was terminated, appears to reference the plaintiffs termination
claim, which was before the Court on appeal. But, the Court also notes that the plaintiff sought an
available position that was left open for several months before she was finally rejected. This
reference squarely matches the facts surrounding the failure-to-promote claim. It is unclear
whether this "lumping" was the result of sloppiness, given that the prima facie case was not really
at issue.
118. Id. at 253.
119. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). In Patterson, the Court also addressed the coverage of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, concluding that the statute only applies to conduct at the initial making of the contract and
conduct which impairs the right to enforce contractual obligations through legal process. Id. at
176 ("Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all
aspects of contract relations, for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and
enforcement of contracts."). This portion of Patterson dealing with the reach of § 1981 was
subsequently overruled by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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African-American woman, worked as a teller and file coordinator for the
defendant credit union.' 20 After approximately ten years of service, she
was laid off.12 ' In response to her termination, the plaintiff filed suit in
federal district court against the defendant employer under § 1981,
alleging that she had been harassed on the job, denied a promotion, and
terminated solely as a consequence of her race.122 With respect to the
failure-to-promote claim central to this comment, judgment was entered
in favor of the defendant following a jury trial.123
The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing,
inter alia, that the district court had erred by instructing the jury that the
plaintiff was required to show that she was better qualified than the promoted employee in order to prevail on her promotion discrimination
claim.1 24 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the instruction was proper
because once the defendant employer raised relative qualifications as its
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the promotion decision, the burden to show pretext and intentional discrimination shifted to the plaintiff.' 25 The court reasoned that, in order to satisfy this burden, the
and, thus, the
plaintiff was required to prove her superior qualifications
12 6
district court had not erred by so instructing the jury.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff again raised the issue
of whether the jury had been properly instructed. 127 With respect to the
prima facie case, the Court stated that:
[Pletitioner [employee] need only prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that she applied for and was qualified for an available position, that she was rejected, and that after she was rejected respondent
or, as
[employer] either continued to seek applicants for the position,
128
employee.
white
a
with
position
the
filled
here,
is alleged
As with Burdine, the Court's formulation of the prima facie case does
not require the plaintiff to demonstrate relative qualifications. In Patterson, this is particularly telling because the very issue before the Courtwhether the district court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff
was required to show that she was better qualified than the promoted
employee-pertains to the plaintiffs burden regarding proof of relative
qualifications. At trial, the plaintiff had established a prima facie case
without proof of relative qualifications. Then, the defendant asserted
120. Id. at 169.

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 170.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1147 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 1147-48.
Patterson,491 U.S. at 170-71.
Id. at 186-87.
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that the promoted employee was better qualified than the plaintiff.' 2 9
The question before the Court was whether, in the third stage, the plaintiff must demonstrate the superiority of her own qualifications in order
to prevail. No such requirement was imposed upon the plaintiff at stage
one by the district court, and the Supreme Court's articulation of the
elements of the prima facie case confirm that no such requirement
should have been imposed at the initial stage.
Nevertheless, the question remained as to whether proof of relative
qualifications was appropriately imposed on the plaintiff at the pretext
stage of the proceedings. After the plaintiffs prima facie case was
established, the defendant rebutted the presumption of discrimination by
articulating that the job was given to the white employee on account of
her superior qualifications relative to the plaintiff. 130 Thus, the burden
shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretext, and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason for the
employment decision. 131 By instructing the jury that the plaintiff was
required to prove that her own qualifications were, in fact, superior to
those of the white employee, the district court misapprehended the
nature of the plaintiff's burden. In the Court's view, the jury instruction
at issue was improper because it required the plaintiffs proof of pretext
to take a certain form.1 32 As the Court put it, "[P]etitioner is not limited
to presenting evidence of a certain type." 133 The plaintiff may not be
forced to pursue any particular avenue of proving pretext, because pretext can be shown in a variety of ways. 134 For example, the Court noted
that the plaintiff might point to the way in which the defendant employer
had treated her in the past. 1 35 Alternatively, although not mentioned by
the Court, the plaintiff could demonstrate that relative qualifications had
not been an important factor in prior promotion decisions by the
employer. If, for example, the employer had a practice of promoting the
employee with the most seniority, regardless of the relative qualifications of the applicants, then the plaintiff could point to that practice in an
attempt to show pretext. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court, in explaining the pretext stage of the framework, stated that an employer's overall
policy and practice with respect to minority employment might be rele129. Id. at 187.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. According to the Court, in order to prevail, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that
the defendant's proffered reason was not its true reason for making the employment decision. See
id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 188.
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vant to a determination of pretext.1 36 The point is simply that there is no
set formula for proving pretext. As the Court stated in Burdine, the
plaintiff may succeed in the pretext phase "either by directly persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered expla1 37
nation is unworthy of credence."'
If it is clear that a plaintiff may never be forced to demonstrate
relative qualifications in the pretext phase (although such a showing
would certainly be permitted), it ought to be equally clear that no such
showing should be required of the plaintiff initially, where the burden is
decidedly "not onerous."' 138 According to casebook authors Zimmer,
Sullivan, and White:
It is obvious that defendant can put into evidence the superior qualifications of the person promoted in its rebuttal case, but it will not need
to do so if plaintiff must prove her qualifications are equal or superior
in order to establish a prima facie case .... The Court [in Patterson]
takes a minimalist approach: "[P]etitioner need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for and was qualified for
an available position, that she was rejected, and that after she was
rejected respondent either continued to seek applicants for the position, or, as is alleged here, filled the position with a white employee."
Thus, to carry her initial burden, plaintiff need not demonstrate that
she was even as well qualified as her white competitor. The partial
dissent of Justices Brennan and Stevens agreed on this point. At the
prima facie stage, "[wie have required . . . proof only that a plaintiff
was qualified for the position she sought,
not proof that she was bet1 39
ter qualified than other applicants."'
Because the plaintiffs initial burden is quite minimal, the door is left
open for her to proffer a variety of additional forms of evidence in
response to claims put forth by the defendant in stage two.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that "there must be at least a
logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the
illegal discrimination for which it establishes a 'legally mandatory,
rebuttable presumption."' "40 In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Cater136. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). Presumably, the
plaintiff would most likely present statistical evidence of the employer's hiring or promotion
practices with respect to minorities, although evidence of a formal policy or practice of excluding
minorities would no doubt suffice as well.
137. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05).
138. See id.at 253.
139. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 124 n.2 (6th ed. 2003) (emphasis added).

140. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996) (quoting Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254 n.7).
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ers Corp., 4 1 the Court confronted the question of whether a fifty-six

year old plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
when the person who replaced him was also over the age of forty, and
thus within the protected class under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 142 Given that the Act prohibits discrimination because of an
individual's age, 43 the Court concluded that it would be improper to
require a plaintiff to establish that the replacement employee was outside
the protected class in order to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. t " Discrimination because of a person's age can still occur
even though the replacement employee is also within the protected class.
As the Court observed, "The fact that one person in the protected class
has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so
' 45
long as he has lost out because of his age."'
The Court's reasoning in O'Connor is relevant to the question of
whether there ought to be a relative qualifications requirement in the
failure-to-promote context. If each element of the prima facie case is
required to bear a logical connection to the discrimination complained
of, then a plaintiff should never be required to establish superior relative
qualifications in attempting to make out a prima facie case. Title VII
prohibits discrimination in employment because of an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is conceivable that an individual might be passed over for a promotion because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin even though the employer ultimately
promoted an employee who was relatively more qualified. Thus, the
fact that one employee loses out to a relatively more qualified employee
is irrelevant (i.e., does not legally preclude a finding of discrimination),
so long as the first employee has lost out because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. To be sure, the fact that an employee more quali141. 517 U.S. 308.
142. Id. at 309.
143. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides, inter alia:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
144. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-12.
145. Id. at 312.
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fled than the plaintiff was chosen does tend to negate a finding of unlawful discrimination. But, as the Court stated in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters,14 6 "The central focus of the inquiry in a case such as
this is always whether the employer is treating 'some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.'"147 For this reason, requiring a plaintiff to prove relative qualifications in order to make out a prima facie case of promotion discrimination is inappropriate. Such a requirement would in effect "weed out"
some legitimate claims of discrimination, particularly those claims arising out of a situation where the employer does in fact illegally discriminate against the plaintiff, but attempts to cover his tracks by promoting a
relatively more qualified candidate.
In The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment
Opportunity, 4 8 Professor Anne Lawton argues that requiring a plaintiff
to prove relative qualifications, especially clearly-superior relative qualifications, is improper because it reduces the number of cases submitted
to the fact-finder for a determination regarding the alleged unlawful
discrimination:
The problem with this requirement is that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are more qualified than the candidate
selected by the employer. Employers normally hire and promote on
the basis of multiple criteria. As a result, an employer can always
point to at least one criterion, which it claims is critical to the position, on which the plaintiff is weaker than the candidate selected.
Requiring plaintiffs to prove clearly-superior qualifications, especially on motions for summary judgment, significantly reduces the
number of cases that will proceed to trial.' 4 9
This critique alludes to the inequality that exists between plaintiffemployee and employer.' 5 0 An employer is permitted to use multiple
146. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
147. Id. at 577 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977)).
148. Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity,

85

MINN.

L. REv. 587 (2000).

149. Id. at 645 (footnote omitted).
150. Recently, due to this inequality between employer and employee, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected an argument that the plaintiff should be required to demonstrate, in order to make out a
prima facie case, that he satisfied the employer's objective, as well as subjective criteria for the
job in question. See Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768-69 (11th Cir. 2005).
In rejecting the argument, the court reasoned:
[T]o demonstrate that he was qualified for the position, a Title VII plaintiff need
only show that he or she satisfied an employer's objective qualifications. The
employer may then introduce its subjective evaluations of the plaintiff at the later
stages of the McDonnell Douglas framework. A contrary rule, under which an
employer's subjective evaluation could defeat the plaintiffs initial prima facie case,
cannot be squared with the structure and purpose of the McDonnell Douglas
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criteria (including subjective criterion) when making employment decisions, and oftentimes an employee denied a promotion may not be capable of identifying the key criteria from the employer's perspective. This
makes it very difficult for an aggrieved employee to demonstrate the
superiority of his qualifications. And, as Lawton notes, the employer

can almost always point to at least one allegedly-critical criterion on
which the plaintiff is inferior to the promoted employee. Because courts
are generally not permitted to interfere with the business judgment of an
employer,' 5 ' there is little a plaintiff can do when his employer utilizes
such a tactic. Therefore, just as a plaintiff should not be required to
demonstrate superior relative qualifications at the prima facie case stage,
the success of the plaintiff's case should not depend on a battle with the
employer in the pretext stage concerning which promotion criteria are
the most important. In such a situation, the McDonnell Douglas framework "tends to discourage the kind of holistic fact finding that is most
likely to reveal the truth about discrimination in the workplace." '5 2
Thus, it is essential that courts and fact-finders remember that the
ultimate question in any employment discrimination case is always
whether one person has been treated less favorably than others because
of a class characteristic upon which an employer may not legally disframework. Specifically, we have made clear that the primafacie case is designed
to include only evidence that is objectively verifiable and either easily obtainableor
within the plaintiffs possession. This permits the plaintiffwho lacks direct evidence
of invidious intent to force the employer to articulate its motivesfor the challenged
employment action so that the plaintiff has an opportunity to show intentional
discrimination by circumstantial evidence. If we were to hold an employer's
subjective evaluations sufficient to defeat the prima facie case, the court's inquiry
would end, and plaintiff would be given no opportunity to demonstrate that the
subjective evaluation was pretextual. Such a blind acceptance of subjective
evaluations is at odds with the intent that underlies the McDonnell Douglas
framework. This is particularly important because we have emphasized that
subjective criteria can be a ready vehicle for race-based decisions. Furthermore, we
cannot reconcile a rule that would essentially require a plaintiff to prove pretext as
part of his prima facie case at the summary judgment stage with the Supreme
Court's instruction that the plaintiff's prima facie burden is not onerous. Thus,
subjective evaluations play no part in the plaintiffs prima facie case. Rather, they
are properly articulated as part of the employer's burden to produce a legitimate
race-neutral basis for its decision, then subsequently evaluated as part of the court's
pretext inquiry.
Id. at 769 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court's reasoning is equally as relevant to
whether a plaintiff ought to bear the burden of demonstrating relative qualifications in order to
establish a prima facie case.
151. See Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 578 ("Courts are generally less competent than
employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they should
not attempt it.").
152. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229, 2237 (1995) (reviewing the use of the burden-shifting framework by district courts at
the pretrial stage).
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criminate. Since, as discussed above, it is possible for an employer to
illegally discriminate even though the "superiorly" qualified candidate
was chosen, the issue of relative qualifications should never be viewed
as outcome-determinative. Evidence of relative qualifications, of
course, may be probative of whether discrimination has occurred. But,
the question to be answered should always be whether unlawful discrimination has occurred in light of all of the evidence. Courts and juries
should view evidence of relative qualifications alongside all of the other
evidence in a given case such that a conclusion may be reached on the
basis of "holistic fact finding."
Professor Kenneth R. Davis has suggested that this "holistic fact
finding" is not possible under the confines of the McDonnell Douglas
53
framework, and, as a result, the framework should be abandoned.'
According to Davis, "A system with flaws so pervasive and serious
eludes even the most laborious efforts at repair."' 1 54 He argues that the
framework erects "artificial evidentiary barriers" at each stage in the
framework, which in effect prevent the parties from presenting their
cases in the manner of their choosing.1 55 Under the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which amended Title VII, a plaintiff need only prove that unlawful discrimination was a factor motivating the adverse employment decision. 156 Davis contends that the McDonnell Douglas framework
conflicts with the 1991 Act in requiring, among other things, that the
plaintiff establish a prima facie case.1 57 In his view, so long as a plaintiff is capable of demonstrating that at least some part of the employer's
decision was based upon an unlawful discriminatory motive, whether a
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case is irrelevant. 58 Therefore,
Davis advocates leaving the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas behind and adopting the traditional practices of civil litigation
for all cases of disparate treatment discrimination:
Such practices allow for adducing proof of pretext. Plaintiffs attorney, on cross-examination, might ask the defendant or its responsible
agent why he made the contested employment decision. If the party
who made the employment decision does not otherwise testify, the
plaintiff could call him as a hostile witness. Having elicited the
153. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step Burden Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 761 (1995).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 744.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivatingfactor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice." (emphasis added)).
157. Davis, supra note 153, at 751.
158. See id.
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alleged reason for the challenged action, the plaintiff would offer
rebuttal evidence. Thus, without the formalism of the McDonnell
Douglas scheme the plaintiff could present to the finder of fact evi-

dence of pretext. To decide the ultimate issue of discriminatory
intent, the jury would weigh this testimony along with all relevant
evidence. Proof bearing on the issue of pretext would be before the
factfinder. Pretext, however, would not receive undue emphasis
and
1 59
would not necessarily be the determining factor at trial.

Since a holistic approach is more likely to properly include legitimate cases of discrimination and properly exclude unsupported claims,
Davis' argument certainly has appeal.16 With respect to the type of
159. Id. at 752-53.
160. Others have quarreled with the wisdom and usefulness of the McDonnell Douglas
framework as well. Professor Jeffery A. Van Detta has written:
[The McDonnell Douglas] framework led to an incredible volume of
controversies. It continued to plague the Supreme Court with its problematic nature
for almost thirty years after its birth. To keep it alive, the Supreme Court was
forced to revisit and repair it in a litany of cases (quite familiar to employment
discrimination lawyers and law students). In the process of this germinating litany,
McDonnell Douglas also became a legal liturgy. Some courts referred to
McDonnell Douglas as a "minuet," a mechanical mantra that often obscured the
underlying substance of the issues raised by the plaintiffs factual contentions.
Well-versed plaintiffs' lawyers have advised their brethren that a "major premise"
of a winning strategy is to "avoid being confined solely to the McDonnell Douglas
model of proof if at all possible."
... In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court did not address why it simply
ignored [the Eighth Circuit's] formulation of the classic tort-type burden of proof
and instead offered a burden-shifting scheme, nor why it came up with this
framework, nor why it let the employer off so lightly by requiring nothing more
than a mere articulation of "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
action. Indeed, Justice Powell's peculiar phrasing [in McDonnell Douglas]-"some
... reason"-makes it appear as if the employer must simply place its hand on its
hip, chin in hand, inventory possible excuses for a discriminatory decision, and
throw one out to see if it will stick.... [Tihe very minuet whose tune was first
called in McDonnell Douglasassured that a good deal of racial discrimination, both
subtle and otherwise, would escape judicial scrutiny. Although Burdine asserted
that "[t]he McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves
to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to th[e] ultimate
question" of whether "defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff,"
the history of the tortured minuet suggests that it obfuscates the question of
discrimination to the detriment of the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas hardly
"eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for" an adverse
employment action, as it was advertised to do. To the contrary, it simply shifts the
"elusive factual question of intentional discrimination" down the line-except now
the plaintiff has the additional burden to prove not only that the defendant is a
discriminator, but also a liar.
Van Detta, supra note 1, at 90-92 (footnotes omitted).
In light of such criticism, one might wonder how it is that we ended up with such a
framework. Professor Van Detta implies that the McDonnell Douglasdecision was spurred by the
Supreme Court's desire to remedy the lack of uniformity among the lower courts in Title VII
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case at issue in this comment-the failure-to-promote case-one way

around the onerous relative qualifications requirement is to simply do
away with the burden-shifting framework altogether. But, one need not
buy into Davis' arguably radical solution in order to recognize the foundational truths in his analysis.
Davis contends that the courts, in requiring every plaintiff to prove

a prima facie case, have "doomed otherwise valid discrimination
claims." 16 1 This is true, he argues, because plaintiffs have been strictly
forced to prove each element of the prima facie case in order for the case
to proceed to the next phase.1 62 If a plaintiff cannot satisfy one or more
elements of the prima facie case, then the defendant-employer is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. In such a situation, the court must grant
summary judgment notwithstanding the possibility that unlawful dis-

crimination may have actually motivated the employment decision. In
such a case, an otherwise valid discrimination claim is defeated at the

courthouse door merely because the plaintiff was incapable of satisfying
the technicalities of the prima facie case.

For example, as Davis explains, in a case of discriminatory discharge or demotion, a plaintiff is required to prove that the employer
attempted to replace the terminated or demoted employee. 163 But,
whether the employer decided to seek a replacement or not has nothing
to do with whether the employer acted unlawfully with respect to the
aggrieved employee. 164 Nevertheless, where the plaintiff cannot show
that the employer sought a replacement, he cannot make out a prima
cases. See id. at 86-87; see also Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and
Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 385 (2004) ("The Court decided to undertake [McDonnell Douglas]
because of the 'notable lack of harmony' in the opinions of the lower courts regarding the
allocation of burdens. Accordingly, it set out the now famous three-part framework under which
employees may prove disparate treatment discrimination." (footnotes omitted)).
Professor William R. Corbett explains that the McDonnell Douglas framework was created to
aid plaintiffs in proving discrimination:
In 1973, in the second Title VII case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court-McDonnell
Douglas-the Court recognized how difficult it is for plaintiffs to present evidence
of discrimination "because of [their] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Accordingly, the Court created a proof structure (or analysis or framework, if you
prefer) to be used in evaluating intentional discrimination cases. Justice O'Connor
would later explain that the shadow was created to aid plaintiffs, who seldom have
the benefit of direct evidence, in the presentation of their evidence of discrimination.
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1549, 1555
(2005) (footnotes omitted). Whether the framework has actually benefited plaintiffs is a
complicated question. Perhaps the best answer is found in Professor Van Detta's characterization
of the "'prima facie case' concept" as "a double-edged sword." See Van Detta, supra note 1, at
74.
161. Davis, supra note 153, at 753.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 756.
164. See id.
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facie case and, thus, the case will never reach a jury. 165
Another example offered by Davis involves the requirement that a
plaintiff demonstrate objective qualifications-i.e., proof that he was
generically qualified for the position sought. 166 This requirement
defeats a claim of discrimination where an unqualified employee is
rejected for a discriminatory reason. 167 "The potential injustice of such
an approach is that, in addition to plaintiffs qualifications, discriminatory intent might have motivated the employer, or, more strikingly, the
plaintiff's qualifications may have played only a minor role in influenc' 68
ing an employer's decision motivated primarily by discrimination."'
The examples cited by Davis illustrate that the requirements of the
prima facie case may, in a given context, result in some legitimate
claims of discrimination getting excluded from consideration by the
fact-finder. The same holds true of the relative qualifications requirement imposed upon the plaintiff in the failure-to-promote context.
Where a plaintiff is incapable of demonstrating that the person actually
promoted is inferiorly (or, at minimum, equally) qualified, the plaintiff
cannot make out a prima facie case (in the jurisdictions imposing the
requirement) and summary judgment must be entered in favor of the
defendant-employer. Such a result is inconsistent with the 1991 Act,
which mandates only that a plaintiff demonstrate that a particular
16 9
employment decision was motivated in part by an illegal reason.
More fundamentally, the result is at odds with the underlying purpose of
Title VII, which represents Congress's desire to eradicate discriminatory
decision-making from the workplace. Surely, in enacting Title VII,
Congress did not intend for an employee denied promotion because of
his race to face defeat at the summary judgment stage due to an inability
to prove relative qualifications. If the task of establishing a prima facie
case is meant to be "not onerous,"' 170 then it is hard to understand why a
plaintiff should have to demonstrate that he is, from the point of view of
his employer, relatively more qualified than the person actually
promoted.
C.

PracticalConsequences of Requiring Proof of Relative
Qualifications

Having surveyed the various approaches used by the Eleventh Circuit and other courts, and having discussed the proper role of relative
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id. at 755.
See id. at 755-56.
Id. at 756.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(M) (2000).
See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S 248, 253 (1981).
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qualifications from a theoretical standpoint, it is now necessary to consider whether requiring proof of relative qualifications has any practical
bearing on the outcome of a given case, lest this entire exercise be rendered academic.
It seems safe to speculate that, in the majority of cases, the outcome
will not depend on whether a court has demanded that the plaintiff provide proof of relative qualifications, at least where the requirement only
asks the plaintiff to show that she is, compared to the person actually
promoted, equally or more qualified. One can imagine a thousand scenarios in which a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case
only to ultimately lose after the employer claims to have promoted a
more able candidate. In these cases, it often makes little difference,
practically speaking, whether the plaintiff is deemed to have lost for
failing to make out a prima facie case or for being unable to prove that
the employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (i.e., that the promoted employee was better qualified) was pretext for intentional
discrimination. 1 '
If, however, the plaintiff is deemed to have established a prima
facie case of promotion discrimination without having shown relative
qualifications, and the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
is that a better qualified candidate was chosen, the plaintiff is afforded
an opportunity to demonstrate pretext. In this respect, not requiring initial proof of relative qualifications by the plaintiff gives her another
opportunity to succeed-in essence, a second bite at the apple-even
though the employer has identified relative qualifications as the reason
for the employment decision. A plaintiff's showing of pretext can be
made "either directly by persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
' 72
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'
Therefore, if the plaintiff can present evidence that the employer's stated
reason is false or that the employment decision was more likely than not
171. Those who believe that the plaintiff will somehow be able to succeed far more easily if
only required to address relative qualifications at the pretext stage (assuming the employer has
asserted relative qualifications as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason), should take note of a
recent Eleventh Circuit opinion. As that panel decision observed, in order to demonstrate pretext,
the plaintiff must show not only that he was, in fact, better qualified than the promoted candidate,
but also that the discrepancies in their qualifications were so apparent as to jump off the page. See
Stuart v. Jefferson County Dep't of Human Res., 152 F. App'x 798, 802 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[The
plaintiff] cannot prove pretext merely by baldly asserting that he was better qualified than the
person who received the position at issue. Instead, he must proffer evidence that the disparity in
qualification was so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face .... [The
discrepancies] must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person could have
chosen [the promoted candidate] over [the plaintiff]." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
172. Burdine, 450 U.S at 256.
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the result of discrimination, the fact-finder is free to conclude that the
employment decision was, more likely than not, motivated by an illegal
reason, and thus may find in favor of the plaintiff. 7 3 In situations where
a plaintiff cannot demonstrate initially that, from the point of view of the
employer, she is equally or more qualified than the promoted employee,
but can offer evidence that the employer is lying, the plaintiff's chance
of success is greatly bolstered when proof of relative qualifications is
not required at the initial stage. 174
Similarly, in situations where an employer has promoted a superiorly-qualified employee, but nonetheless denied promotion to the plaintiff discriminatorily (i.e., for an illegal reason), the plaintiff will have an
increased chance of success if not required to demonstrate relative qualifications at the outset. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff has no
chance of proving his case if he is required to show relative qualifications in order to establish a prima facie case because, factually speaking,
it is simply untrue that he is more qualified than the promoted individual. By contrast, where proof of relative qualifications is not required,
the plaintiff has at least some hope of carrying the day by proffering
evidence tending to show that the employer acted unlawfully. While the
plaintiff in such a case would, of course, face an uphill climb, it would
be inconsistent with Title VII to prevent him from trying to prove his
case in a holistic manner-especially where, from an omniscient point
of view, we know that unlawful discrimination prompted the employment decision in this hypothetical case.
Finally, the relative qualifications requirement could affect the
plaintiff's chance of success in yet another set of circumstances as well.
As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted, albeit in dicta, "Difficult as it
might be to prove, a promotion could be denied for discriminatory reasons even though no one outside the protected class was promotedeven though there were no comparators and therefore no prima facie
case."'7 5 This could play out in a couple of different ways. In situations
173. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993).
174. The hypothetical case described here does not necessarily envision a plaintiff-employee
who is, in reality, inferiorly qualified as compared to the promoted employee. Rather, it envisions
a plaintiff who simply is unable to obtain from her employer the pertinent information indicating
how (i.e., by what method and criteria) the qualifications of the employees under consideration
were ranked. Because, in such a situation, the employer is the holder of key information, the
plaintiff has no choice but to attempt to expose the proffered explanation as false when the reason
put forth for the employment decision is relative qualifications. Under such circumstances, a
plaintiff's cause is aided greatly when she is not required to prove relative qualifications at the
outset.
175. Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added) (requiring proof of relative qualifications at stage one).
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where no one was promoted instead of the plaintiff (i.e., where the
employer simply did not fill the position), the plaintiff literally cannot
prove that she was more qualified than some other candidate. Nonetheless, the employer's decision to deny the plaintiff's promotion could
have been motivated by unlawful discrimination, despite the fact that the
position was not subsequently filled with another employee. Notwithstanding this logic, a district court recently held that the plaintiff could
not establish a prima facie case because no one else had been promoted
(and hence no comparator existed).' 7 6
Perhaps even worse, defeat may await the plaintiff even though the
employer promoted another individual. If the promoted candidate is not
from "outside the protected class," the plaintiff's prima facie case may
be deemed deficient, as one plaintiff recently discovered. 17 7 In CaputoConyers v. Berkshire Realty Holdings, LP, 178 the district court held that
the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of gender discrimination in part because she did not allege that her employer had promoted
an equally or less qualified employee from outside the protected
class.1 79 Such a showing would have been impossible because the
employer filled the position with another female.1 80 So, what's the
problem? How can a woman denied promotion claim gender discrimination when the employer proceeded to hire another woman? In most
situations, it seems safe to say, gender discrimination would not have
motivated the employment decision. But, in Caputo-Conyers,the plaintiff was pregnant, while the promoted female was single and not pregnant."' Thus, it is at least possible that the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff because of her pregnancy, and hence because of her
sex.1 82 Yet, because the court demanded proof that the employer had
176. See Labady v. Gemini Air Cargo, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011-12 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
("The undisputed facts reveal that while Defendant interviewed Plaintiff and several other
candidates for the General Manager position, it decided not to fill the position due to budget
constraints and a reduction in force. Thus, because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth prong of the
prima facie test that 'other equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the
protected class were promoted,' he is unable to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
failure to promote." (citation omitted)). One should note that McDonnell Douglas did not require
the plaintiff to show that the sought-after position had been filled; rather, the plaintiff was only
asked to demonstrate that the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applications from persons of plaintiffs qualifications. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
177. See Caputo-Conyers v. Berkshire Realty Holdings, LP, No. 6:05CV341ORL31KRS, 2005
WL 1862697, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2005).
178. 2005 WL 1862697.
179. See id. at *4.
180. See id. at *4 n.9.
181. See id.
182. As the Caputo-Conyers court observes, Title VII protects against discrimination on

account of pregnancy:
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promoted other equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the protected class, the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie
case.' 8 3 While a plaintiff like Caputo-Conyers might find it difficult to

succeed in proving her claim, such a plaintiff should be given an opportunity to demonstrate that her employer behaved discriminatorily; she
should not be ushered from the courthouse at such an early stage in the
case.
Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which
expands the definition of sexual discrimination and states, in relevant part,
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title
shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Pregnancy is therefore a protected classification under the
statute.
See id. at *4-*5.
183. See id. at *4 (noting the plaintiff's failure "to address two of the four elements of a prima
facie discrimination claim," and concluding that "her claims in Count I of gender discrimination
in promotions will be dismissed"). The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's claim of
pregnancy discrimination "because the Plaintiff [did] not allege in her Complaint that she was
treated differently than a non-member of her protected class." See id. at *5 ("Specifically, the
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege that a non-member of the Plaintiff's protected class was
promoted in her stead, or that after she was terminated, a non-member replaced her. Therefore,
Count 2 will be dismissed."). The court's utter failure to conceive of gender discrimination absent
the hiring of a male reflects a misapprehension of Title VII and its underlying purposes. The
court's narrow-minded approach is even more startling when one considers the facts of the case:
BRH hired the Plaintiff in May of 2003 as Assistant Property Manager at the
Altamonte Bay Club, a property BRH owns. While she was employed, the Plaintiff
performed the duties of her job in a satisfactory manner, received positive
performance reviews, and was awarded merit pay increases. In November of 2003, a
District Manager approached the Plaintiff and offered her a promotion to the
position of Property Manager for the Altamonte Bay Club. During her interview for
that promotion, the Plaintiff informed the District Manager that she was pregnant
and due to deliver in May of 2004. The Plaintiff also informed the District Manager
that she would apply for coverage under the Family and Medical Leave Act for the
birth, but that she planned to work up until her due date, unless she was advised
otherwise by her physician. After being advised of the Plaintiff's pregnancy, the
District Manager withdrew the offer of promotion.
The Plaintiff continued working as Assistant Property Manager until February
of 2004, when she applied for, and was approved for, coverage under the Family
and Medical Leave Act, after her physician advised her of a serious health condition
connected with her pregnancy. While the Plaintiff was on leave, she continued to
perform her job duties, received regular paychecks, and accrued vacation and sick
time.
In May of 2004, while still on leave, the Plaintiff sought, and was again denied,
a promotion to the Property Manager position. She was scheduled to return from
leave on June 28, 2004. However, her employment was terminated on June 21,
2004.
See id. at *1 (footnote omitted).
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V.

CONCLUSION: WHERE TO

Go

FROM HERE

In sum, we have seen that the federal courts have struggled to identify the proper role of relative qualifications in cases of promotion discrimination under Title VII. This struggle is epitomized by the intracircuit split of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed above.
While the vast majority of courts within the Eleventh Circuit continue to
require the plaintiff to demonstrate proof of relative qualifications in
order to make out a prima facie case of promotion discrimination, such a
showing should not be required. Legally speaking, the prevailing rule
within the Eleventh Circuit does not require proof of relative qualifications as an element of the prima facie case. But, regardless of the Circuit's technically-prevailing standard, a much deeper and important
question is whether a plaintiff should have to demonstrate relative qualifications, not just at stage one, but at all. As I hope the aforementioned
arguments demonstrate, a plaintiff should never be required to demonstrate relative qualifications, whether it be at stage one (prima facie case)
or stage three (pretext). Such a requirement runs contrary to the congressional intent underlying Title VII, namely that all forms of discrimination within the workplace be eradicated. The fact that the relative
qualifications requirement undercuts Congress's goal is clear: If a plaintiff who has been denied promotion for an illegal reason is unable to
show that the promoted employee is equally or inferiorly qualified, that
plaintiff necessarily must lose, notwithstanding the fact that the
employer acted in contravention of Title VII. In this way, the relative
qualifications requirement is arbitrary and unfair.
In terms of addressing the problem, there are at least three possible
solutions. First, Congress could undertake to amend Title VII, statutorily adopting the McDonnell Douglas framework for circumstantial evidence cases of disparate treatment and specifically stating that a plaintiff
need only satisfy the basic elements of the prima facie case as articulated
in McDonnell Douglas itself, regardless of whether a denial of promotion or some other discriminatory type of employment decision is
alleged. The second possible solution is derived from the work of Professor Davis: Either Congress or the Supreme Court could explicitly do
away with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in favor
of the traditional practices of civil litigation.
While the two suggestions above would undoubtedly eliminate the
problem, there is a more modest answer. Either on their own initiative
or at the Supreme Court's behest, the federal courts could simply stop
requiring proof of relative qualifications (whether at stage one or three)
in promotion discrimination cases. Instead, both plaintiff and defendant,
while not required to proffer evidence of relative qualifications, would

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:365

be permitted to do so. In other words, the relative qualifications requirement would be transformed from a mandatory showing to a discretionary one. While this approach to the problem at hand is least radical, it
also happens to be the least likely, given the divergence within the federal circuits. Whatever form the solution takes, it is clear that something
must be done about the erroneous relative qualifications requirement in
cases of promotion discrimination under Title VII. I am not Einstein, so
the perfect solution is not apparent to me, but I am relatively satisfied
with my work here, as I subscribe to Kettering's view that "[a] problem
well stated is a problem half solved."t 4
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